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I Introduction 
 
Older people enjoy the same freedom as other adults to enter into relationships, including 
sexual relationships.  However, this exercise of autonomy and self-determination can be 
regarded as problematic when an older person is perceived to have lost the capacity to 
make decisions about sexual relations.  While the law adopts an approach that is designed 
to support incompetent adults to continue to make decisions to the greatest extent 
possible,1 carers and family members can become concerned about an incapacitated older 
person having sexual relations.2  This may be because of fears of abuse or exploitation, or 
because of social or familial stigma about sex.  Where the older person lives in an aged 
residential care facility (“resthome”3), carers or family may complain about sexual 
relationships, or even ask staff to prevent sexual contact from occurring.   
 
Anecdotally, resthomes struggle with the vexed question of sex and incompetent adults.  
Resthomes have a number of legal and professional obligations to protect residents from 
harm,4 and a legal duty to uphold residents’ rights to be treated with respect, to have their 
privacy respected, and to provide services in a manner that recognises dignity and 
independence.5  It is not difficult to see how the tension between carers’ responsibilities 
and individual autonomy could result in the erosion of the right to self-determination.   
 
With this tension in mind, this paper discusses consent for sexual relations and the law on 
determining capacity to give such consent.  It argues that the context in which decisions 
about sexual relations and capacity assessments are made is relevant to determining 
capacity.  Then, with a particular focus on those elderly with questionable or fluctuating 
capacity, it explores how expressed wishes about sexual relations might establish the 
necessary consent to sex while also balancing the need to protect those in need of 
protection.  A proposed model of statutory supported decision-making and the existing 
framework for substituted decision-making are canvassed, and advocated as lawful 
  
1 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, s 8(b). 
2 “Incapacitated” and “incompetent” are used interchangeably in this paper. 
3 Resthome is used here to refer to aged residential care facilities that provide 24 hour caregiver care to 
residents, and facilities that provide 24 hour hospital level care.  
4 See for example the legal duty to protect vulnerable adults from risk of sexual assault: Crimes Act 1961, 
s 195A (an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 10 years).  
5 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) 
Regulations 1996, Right 1 and 3. 
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mechanisms to uphold expressed wishes while also allowing for risk assessment and 
protection.  It then suggests that more can and should be done to address questions about 
sexual relationships in the elderly.  Advance directives are encouraged as a means to 
express how a person wants to live once incapacitated, and to influence decisions made 
after incapacity.  Finally, it is recommended that resthomes should develop industry 
agreed guidelines on sexual relations in resthomes to expressly guide staff, individuals 
and families about sex in that setting, and to address the difficult questions that can arise 
when adults who are perceived to lack capacity enter sexual relationships.    
  
II Consent and Sexual Relations 
 
It is a well-accepted principle that all adults of sound mind have a right to determine what 
should be done with their own body.6  Thus, subject to the bounds of the law, competent 
adults have the freedom to choose how and with whom they might enter into sexual 
relations.7  Consent, and therefore the capacity to make a decision to have sex, is an 
essential legal requirement for sexual relations.  In the absence of consent, sexual 
connection is a criminal offence.8   
 
Importantly, the criminal law deems consent to be absent in circumstances where a person 
is “affected by an intellectual, mental, or physical condition or impairment of such a nature 
and degree that he or she cannot consent or refuse to consent to the activity.”9  
Commentary to the Crimes Act 1961 suggests that “prior consent or an implication of 
consent derived from the nature and history of the relationship and the surrounding 
circumstances is not relevant.”10  This indicates that a mutually consensual sexual 
relationship prior to incapacity will not operate as a defence. 
 
It is also a criminal offence to have “exploitative sexual connection with a person with a 
significant impairment”,11 being a condition that significantly impairs the capacity to 
understand the nature or to foresee the consequences of sexual conduct.12  In a judgment 
  
6 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospitals 211 NY 125, 105 NE 92 (1914) at 130, 93. 
7 The bounds of the law is reference to the fact that some sexual acts are criminal acts, including incest and 
sexual connection with minors. 
8 Crimes Act 1961, s 128. 
9 Crimes Act 1961, s 128A(5). 
10 Bruce Robertson (ed.) Adams on Criminal Law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CA128A.05]. 
11 Crimes Act 1961, s 138. 
12 Crimes Act 1961, s 138(6). 
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on a similar provision in United Kingdom (UK) law,13 the criminal jurisdiction of the 
House of Lords made it clear that capacity to consent relates to the specific act of sexual 
touching.14  However, not all sexual relations are (or should be) viewed through the lens 
of the criminal law, which is concerned with specific alleged acts at a past point in time.   
 
III The Law on Capacity to Consent to Sexual Relations 
 
In New Zealand, the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (PPPRA) 
provides a legal framework for protecting and promoting the personal rights of those not 
able to manage their own affairs.  It creates a presumption of competence to make 
decisions until the contrary is proven.15  Rebutting the presumption requires a 
determination that a person is not capable of understanding the nature, or foreseeing the 
consequences, of their decisions.16  In general terms, assessing capacity under the PPPRA 
involves consideration of an individual’s ability to communicate his or her choice; to 
understand relevant information; to “appreciate the situation and its consequences”; and 
to manipulate information.17   
 
Applying the statutory test to sexual relations would likely involve an assessment of a 
person’s understanding of the sex act itself, the risks of sexually transmitted infection and 
pregnancy, and the ability to communicate the choice (including the choice to say no).    
For the older adult, it is arguable that the understanding of the sex act may exist through 
prior experience, and for older women the risk and implications of pregnancy is removed 
by menopause.  Understanding the risk of sexually transmitted diseases would, however, 
remain a relevant matter.18  
 
  
13 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK), s 30. 
14 R v C [2009] UKHL 42, at [26], [2009] 4 All ER 1033. 
15 PPPRA, s 5. 
16 PPPRA, s 5. 
17 Sylvia Bell and Professor Warren Brookbanks “Decision-Making and the Protection of Personal and 
Property Rights Act 1988” in Kate Diesfeld and Ian McIntosh (eds.) Elder Law in New Zealand (Thomson 
Reuters, Wellington 2014) 79 at 89, citing KR v MR [2004] 2 NZLR 847 (HC). 
18 There is evidence of an increasing prevalence in sexually transmitted infections in the elderly.  See for 
example Roberta Bilenchi, Sara Poggiali, Chiara Pisani, Mariele De Paola, Rosanna Sculco, Lucia Anna De 
Padova and Michele Fimiana “Sexually Transmitted Diseases in Elderly People: An Epidemiological Study 
in Italy” (2009) 57(5) J Am Geriatr Soc 938. 
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As to understanding the “situation and its consequences”, some guidance may be taken 
from case law considering the question of capacity to enter into marriage.19  The test for 
capacity for marriage involves more than a functional assessment of the nature of the act:20 
 
…a person can be perfectly well aware of the nature of marriage and what 
it involves, yet lack the intellectual capacity to decide whether or not to 
marry a particular person or to resist a decision to marry that person. 
 
There are, however, limitations with a comparative analysis between consent to sex and 
consent to marriage.  Importantly, marriage is not solely concerned with sexual relations 
and, unlike most sexual relationships, it involves a potentially long-lasting legal 
relationship with implications for property and inheritance rights.   That said, if New 
Zealand courts adopt a similar approach as with consent to marriage, capacity for sexual 
relations would require both a functional understanding of sex and an understanding of 
circumstances in which the sexual act may occur, including the identity of the sexual 
partner.   
 
In the UK, this so-called “situation specific” capacity to consent is applied in the criminal 
jurisdiction, where the leading decision puts it this way:21 
 
…it is difficult to think of an activity which is more person and situation 
specific than sexual relations.  One does not consent to sex in general.  One 
consents to this act of sex with this person at this time and in this place.  
Autonomy entails the freedom and the capacity to make a choice of whether 
or not to do so. 
 
In contrast, the UK Court of Appeal has confirmed that an “issue specific, rather than 
person or event specific”22  assessment applies to sexual relations in the context of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), which relates to adults who lack capacity and which 
provides a framework for protecting vulnerable adults from abuse, coercion and 
  
19 For the purpose of this paper, marriage may be read as including civil unions. 
20 X v X (2000) 19 FRNZ 544, at [28].  The Court held, at [76], that “Mr X’s disease, in all the surrounding 
circumstances including his increasing dependence on Mrs X and his increasing isolation from his own 
family, had robbed him of the ability to make the reasoned and informed decisions which were a necessary 
prerequisite of an agreement to marry Mrs X”. 
21 Anove n 14, at [27]. 
22 IM v LM [2014] EWCA Civ. 37, at [79]. 
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exploitation.23  Thus, it is sufficient to “understand the rudiments of the sexual act, [and 
to have] a basic understanding of issues of contraception and the risks of sexually 
transmitted disease.”24  In reaching this view, the Court of Appeal endorsed the need for 
pragmatic limits on “what needs to be envisaged as ‘reasonably foreseeable 
consequences’”, noting that: 25  
  
…the information typically, and we stress typically, regarded by persons of 
full capacity as relevant to the decision whether to consent to sexual relations 
is relatively limited.  The temptation to expand that field of information in 
an attempt to simulate more widely informed decision-making is likely to 
lead to…both paternalism and a derogation from personal autonomy. 
 
Accordingly, the UK Court of Appeal purports to uphold autonomy by judging an 
otherwise incompetent adult’s capacity for sexual relations against the relatively limited 
questions competent adults may ask themselves about sexual relations.  Put another way, 
the threshold is not so high as to require adults who lack capacity in other respects to 
demonstrate an analysis of sexual relations that would not be required of competent others.  
As one UK court described it, the protective purpose of the MCA is not to wrap a person 
in “forensic cotton wool” but to allow them as far as possible to make the same mistakes 
that others “are at liberty to make and not infrequently do”.26   
 
This “desire to avoid paternalism, while supporting autonomy” has been criticised for 
overlooking the fact that there is limited, if any, evidence about what considerations are 
relevant to a competent person’s decision about sexual relations, and the extent to which 
this is different for a person who is under some disability.27  The low threshold has also 
been criticised for interpreting autonomy as simply allowing incompetent adults to have 
sex, without proper regard to the need to protect those who are at risk of abuse.28  In 
particular, a suggestion from the UK courts that vetting sexual partners would be 
unworkable has been condemned as inconsistent with a protective role,29 and because it 
  
23 Above n 22.  
24 Above n 22, at [18], citing the decision of the Court of Protection, which was upheld. 
25 Above n 22 at [79] and [82].   
26 Above n 22, at [81] citing A NHS Trust v P [2013] EWHC 2322 (COP). 
27 Robin Mackenzie and John Watts “Capacity to Consent to Sex Reframed: IM, TZ (no2), the need for an 
evidence-based model of sexual decision-making and socio-sexual competence” (2015) 40 Int J Law 
Psychiat 50, at 52-53. 
28 Jonathan Herring and Jesse Wall “Capacity to Consent to Sex” (2014) 22(4) Med Law Rev. 620 at 629. 
29 Above n 28 at 629.  
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risks “privileging administrative convenience over the need for a test which is sensitive 
to…the vulnerabilities of those…whose capacity is in question.”30   
 
Against this, it is arguable that setting comprehensive (and more sensitive) criteria for 
assessing capacity has a number of possible drawbacks, including the risk of placing 
people with certain diagnoses (e.g. dementia) into a category that is effectively deemed 
incapable of consenting to sexual relations.   Strict ‘person and event’ assessments may 
also be inadequate to recognise that capacity can fluctuate, and that people with varying 
degrees of incapacity may retain the ability to make genuine choices about entering into 
sexual relations.    
 
As can be seen, debate as to the appropriate measure of capacity is complex, lacking in 
empirical evidence, and strongly influenced by the differing perspectives of individual 
autonomy and protective interests.  While setting a low (i.e. functional understanding) 
threshold for capacity may endorse sexual freedom, it also creates a risk of at least some 
incidents of non-consensual sex.  Conversely, although a high threshold may provide a 
greater degree of protection by potentially excluding more individuals from sexual 
relations, it also risks being a paternalistic intrusion into self-determination, even in the 
absence of vulnerability.   
 
To attempt to balance autonomy and protection, it is suggested that any assessment of 
capacity for sexual relations must be conscious of the need to protect those “whose limited 
capacity prevents them from appreciating the risks,”31 while not interfering with decisions 
unless protection is objectively necessary.  However, resthomes’ (and other carers’) legal 
obligations may favour protective outcomes that prevent “detached and objective” 
capacity assessments.32  Although protection will be appropriate in some cases, to avoid 
unnecessary limits on autonomy it is important for those raising questions about capacity 
to be required to give consideration to the whole context in which decisions about sexual 
relations, and capacity assessments, are made.   
 
 
 
 
  
30 Above n 28.  
31 Re R M S [PPPR] (1993) 10 FRNZ 387, at 392. 
32 A Local Authority v TZ (No.2) [2014] EWHC 973 (COP), at [28]. 
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IV Capacity Assessments in Context  
 
The starting point is that loss of capacity is not a normal part of ageing, and therefore ‘old 
age’ (however defined) is insufficient to establish incapacity, or even vulnerability.33  That 
said, dementia is a “disease of the ageing”34  that impacts on memory, reasoning and 
language skills.35  While dementia alone should not be enough to establish incapacity, a 
diagnosis of dementia, including the rate of cognitive decline and behavioural changes 
over the course of the disease, must be relevant to determining capacity.  In addition, the 
extent to which dementia is coupled with disinhibited sexual behaviour, either in 
inappropriate settings or towards unwilling participants, will also be relevant.36  That is, 
observable changes in attitude or desire for sex that can be attributed to dementia may be 
relevant to the genuineness of a person’s choice, their vulnerability, and the risk they pose 
to themselves or others.37  
 
More broadly, it is clearly arguable that a person’s capacity to consent to sexual relations 
is “affected by relationships with sexual partners.”38  Therefore, assessing capacity must 
logically involve consideration of the sexual relationship in question.  This could be 
particularly relevant in resthomes, where residents may have long-term relationships that 
remain important despite cognitive decline, or where residents simply seek comfort and 
  
33 For this reason alone, imposing an upper limit for the age of consent to sexual relations must be rejected.  
See for example Stephanie L. Tang “When “Yes” Might Mean “No”: Standardizing State Criteria to 
Evaluate the Capacity to Consent to Sexual Activity for Elderly with Neurocognitive Disorders” (2015) 22 
Elder L.J 449, at 478. 
34 Michael Boyd, Chris Perkins and Rod Perkins “Older Adult Health Issues: The Emerging Implications in 
New Zealand” in Kate Diesfeld and Ian McIntosh (eds.) Elder Law in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington 2014) 59 at 65. 
35 Ministry of Health “Dementia” <www.health.govt.nz/your-health/conditions-and-treatments/mental-
health/dementia> accessed 18 March 2016.     
36 See Gabriele Cipriani, Martina Ulivi, Sabrina Danti, Claudio Lucetti and Angelo Nuti “Sexual 
Disinhibitions and Dementia” (2016) 16 Psychogeriatrics 145. 
37 See for example A Report by the Health and Disability Commissioner (Case 04HDC07008) 
<http://www.hdc.org.nz/decisions--case-notes/commissioner's-decisions/2006/04hdc07008> highlighting 
the risks faced by vulnerable resthome residents to incidents of inappropriate sexual behaviour by a resident 
with dementia.  Accessed 24 February 2016. 
38 Lucy Series “Relationships, Autonomy and Legal Capacity: Mental Capacity and Support Paradigms” 
(2015) 40 Int J Law Psychiat 80 at 82. 
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intimacy in what has become their ‘home’ environment.  In other words, it must be 
recognised that healthy relationships can be integral to a person’s wellbeing:39 
 
There’s nothing about being cognitively impaired that means that you 
wouldn’t necessarily appreciate being connected with other people through 
both nonsexual means and sexual means. 
 
Consideration of the relational context should not be understood as requiring a person to 
be (or intending to be) in a stable or long-term relationship in order to have sexual 
relations.  Instead, it is suggested that for an accurate picture of capacity for sexual 
relations consideration should be given to all the factors that may influence capacity, 
including the sexual partner.  While scrutinising (intended) sexual partners may be 
regarded by some as an intrusion into a person’s right to privacy, such an inquiry is not 
necessarily an anathema to autonomy.  It is equally arguable that making an assessment 
of relational factors actually supports autonomous decision-making, while also allowing 
for a proper assessment of vulnerability and risk.40  In resthomes, asking residents about 
sexual relationships is a reasonable part of discharging the obligation to protect them from 
harm.  It also goes some way to supporting a person’s ability to have sexual relationships 
in a safe and supportive environment.    
 
Relationships with others can also provide an otherwise incapacitated person with support 
and guidance for decision-making.  Autonomy has “social and relational dimensions” that 
may influence capacity, and therefore examining how an incompetent person utilises 
others to assist with decision-making is important.41  In addition, it must be acknowledged 
that the identity of the person who undertakes the assessment may influence its outcome, 
whether for lack of trust on one hand or lack of knowledge about the person concerned on 
the other.  Likewise, capacity assessments should have regard to the factors that may 
  
39 See “Former Iowa legislator Henry Royhons, 78, found not guilty of sexually abusing wife with 
alzheimers” (23 April 2015) The Washington Post < www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/04/23/former-iowa-legislator-henry-rayhons-78-found-not-guilty-of-sexually-abusing-wife-
with-alzheimers> accessed 24 February 2016. 
40 It is notable, for example, that in IM v LM the initial application had been made by a male friend of the 
incapacitated woman who wished to have sex with her (and the order allowing contact had been appealed 
by the woman’s mother).     
41 Above n 38, at 81.  
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temporarily affect capacity, such as tiredness, stress or medication, and should expressly 
recognise that capacity may fluctuate for these reasons.42     
 
While the courts exercising powers under the PPPRA will very likely consider the context 
for the decision, a clear statutory requirement to do so would provide greater clarity for 
individuals and resthomes about how capacity will be assessed.  Therefore, it is suggested 
that rebutting the presumption of competence should expressly require consideration of 
all the circumstances relevant to the capacity to make the decision.  This could be achieved 
by amending the PPPRA to read that: “…every person shall be presumed, until in all the 
circumstances relevant to the decision the contrary is proved, to have the capacity…” 
(addition underlined).  It is noted that such a requirement could well signal that mere 
functional understanding of sex is an insufficient basis for capacity.  In other words, an 
individual’s failure to appreciate the significance or implications of a particular sexual 
relationship could be fatal to his or her perceived understanding of the nature and 
consequences of their decision.  That said, contextual matters are equally relevant to 
consideration of how expressed wishes for sexual relations might be facilitated.  
 
V Making Decisions about Sexual Relations   
 
It is recognised that incapacity can create significant vulnerability and expose people to 
exploitation.  For some incompetent adults there will be no basis on which expressed 
wishes for sexual relations can be upheld.  However, between obvious competence and 
complete incapacity is a grey area of questionable (or fluctuating) capacity.  This section 
is concerned with upholding, where possible, the rights of those older adults who retain 
some degree of capacity for making personal choices.  As noted by the former Health and 
Disability Commissioner (HDC):43 
 
…it does not necessarily follow from the fact that consumers require care and 
support in some areas of their life that they are not capable of participating in a 
sexual relationship, or making decisions about their sexuality.  To make this 
  
42 See for example Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 3(3): “The fact that a person is able to retain the information 
relevant to a decision for a short period only does not prevent him from being regarded as able to make the 
decision.” 
43 Ron Paterson “Relationships and Rights – The Application of the Code of Rights to Consumers with 
Intellectual Disability” (2009) <www.hdc.org.nz/education/presentations/relationships-and-rights--the-
application-of-the-code-of-rights-to-consumers-with-intellectual-disability> accessed 21 March 2016.  
While the article relates to adults with intellectual disabilities, the comments are equally applicable to elderly 
with impaired capacity. 
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assumption where it is not appropriate places unnecessary limits on a 
consumer’s independence.   
 
Studies suggest that sex can remain an important part of an elderly person’s life, and that 
even with cognitive decline individuals may derive “emotional pleasure…life satisfaction, 
confidence and overall psychological health” from sexual relations.44  Those adults with 
impaired capacity should not, therefore, automatically be deprived of the opportunity to 
maintain or enter into sexual relations.   
 
However, despite the existence of legislation intended to promote and protect the rights 
of incompetent adults, New Zealand courts have not yet been asked to consider an 
otherwise incompetent person’s capacity to consent to sexual relations.  That said, New 
Zealand law does not expressly recognise a ‘right’ to sex.  The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (NZBORA) confirms the right to association and freedom from discrimination,45 
meaning that individuals enjoy the freedom to choose whom they associate with 
(including the nature of such relationships46), and freedom not to be discriminated against 
by virtue of their age or disability.47  On the face of it, these rights could possibly extend 
to sexual relationships, although this has not been tested.   
 
The NZBORA also affirms that it does not limit any “existing right or freedom.”48  
Therefore, rights existing at common law and international law may be relevant to sexual 
‘rights’.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires signatories 
(including New Zealand) to recognise the right to marry and found a family.49  Similarly, 
the European Convention on Human Rights recognises the right to respect for private and 
family life, and to marry and found a family.50  At international law, these rights have 
been interpreted as including the freedom to engage in sexual activity “largely free from 
state interference.”51  However, while New Zealand courts have previously expressed a 
view that protection of private and family life is an important value in New Zealand law, 
  
44 Above n 33 at 460. 
45 Sections 17 and 19.  
46 Provided they are not for a criminal purpose.  See Kerr v Attorney-General [1996] DCR 951, at 958. 
47 Human Rights Act 1993, s 21(1)(h) and (i). 
48 Section 28. 
49 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 23.  Article 17 recognises that “No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence…”. 
50 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8 and 12.   
51 Richard Griffith and Cassam Tengnah “Assessing Capacity to Consent to Sexual Relations: A Guide For 
Nurses” (2013) 18(4) BR J Community Nurs. 198. 
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it is not strictly recognised as a justiciable common law right in itself.52  Nevertheless, in 
the absence of direct consideration of sexual rights in New Zealand, international law may 
still provide an important basis for any purported ‘right’ to sexual relations.   
 
Another source of rights is the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights 
(Code of Rights).  The Code of Rights applies to the provision of health and disability 
services, including resthome care.  It creates rights to respect, privacy and services that 
recognise dignity and independence.53  Where a resthome is regarded as a person’s 
‘home’, these rights could be interpreted as including the necessary privacy for intimate 
contact, or at least the opportunity for intimacy, largely free from intrusion.  While there 
is scope for these rights to be relevant to sexual relationships, there are no HDC cases that 
provide examples of individuals seeking to advocate these rights as including sexual 
relations.54   
 
Whether sexual relations can be translated into a ‘right’ that is deserving of promotion or 
protection is unclear.  However, if it is accepted that sexual relations can be an important 
aspect of a person’s relationships, wellbeing or way of life, and that such decisions are 
also intrinsically linked to privacy and independent choice, then it is arguable that sex is 
a matter that is worthy of careful consideration and possibly protection, even when there 
are questions about capacity.  While the ‘rights’ focus of the PPPRA is intended to 
facilitate and support the subject person,55 it is evident that protection of those with limited 
capacity is also an important aspect of the PPPRA jurisdiction.56  With this in mind, the 
way in which a person who is perceived to lack capacity might be supported to give valid 
consent for sexual relations, and whether such decisions can be made on his or her behalf, 
is explored below.    
A Supported Decision-Making 
Social supports can influence capacity and assist decision-making, and therefore 
supported decision-making can offer those with diminished or declining capacity an 
opportunity to retain some control over their personal choices.  Currently, the only 
  
52 See for example Helu v Immigration and Protection Tribunal [2015] NZSC 28, at [76], [2016] 1 NZLR 
298. 
53 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) 
Regulations 1996, Right 1 and 3. 
54 The Health and Disability Commissioner may investigate alleged breaches of the Code of Rights and 
publish opinions as to whether or not a breach has occurred. 
55 T-E v B [Contact] [2009] NZFLR 844 (HC), at [18].   
56 Above n 31. 
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statutory model for ‘supported decision-making’ in New Zealand is the requirement under 
the PPPRA for welfare guardians and those acting under an enduring power of attorney 
(EPA) to consult with and encourage an incompetent individual to act on their own 
behalf.57  However, those appointed decision-makers also have a responsibility to protect 
that person’s welfare, and their decision will ultimately override the wishes of the person 
concerned.58  Similarly, in exercising jurisdiction under the PPPRA a court must “enable 
or encourage” the exercise of capacity, but it can still make decisions in that person’s 
place.59  Thus, these ‘supported decisions’ are simply a precursor to, or relevant 
consideration for, substituted decisions. 
  
In contrast, in other jurisdictions there are legal frameworks for supported decision-
making where there is no corresponding power of substituted decision-making.  To 
illustrate, since 2000 Sweden has had a system of personal ombudsmen, a user controlled 
service focused on client (not relative or authority) priorities, whereby skilled individuals 
provide independent support for an incompetent client’s wishes in a variety of matters, 
including sexuality.60  In Canada, supported decision-making has been expressly included 
in legislation to give “trusted friends and relatives” legal status as “associate decision-
makers” to participate in discussions when an impaired adult is making decisions.61 
Decisions are made with the assistance of the associate, but not by the associate, and 
decisions made or communicated with such assistance are binding except to the extent 
that fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence exist.62  Supported decision-making 
agreements may be entered into if a person understands the nature and the effect of the 
agreement, which suggests that a person with partial capacity may agree to support for 
identified types of decisions.63  Those decisions could reasonably include relationships 
with others.   
 
Closer to home, between 2010-2012 South Australia piloted a non-statutory ‘supported 
decision-making’ project in which incompetent adults entered support agreements for 
  
57 PPPRA, ss 18(4), 98A(3) and 99A(1)(a). 
58 PPPRA, ss 18(3), 98A(2).   
59 PPPRA, ss 8(b) and 10. 
60 Maths Jesperson “The Personal Ombudsman System in Sweden” (Presentation at Ler Seminario 
Internacional sobre Discapacidad, Salud Mental y Cuidado Facultad de Medicina, Universidad de Chile, 
Santiago, Chile, 28 March 2015).  Note that the personal ombudsman system developed out of psychiatric 
reforms in 1995, and generally applies to individuals with mental health issues.    
61 Decision Making, Support and Protection to Adults Act 2003 (Yukon, Canada), ss 4 and 8. 
62 Above n 61, s 11.  
63 Above n 61, s 4. 
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assistance from friends or family for decisions about various life choices.64   The project 
focused on minimising substituted decision-making by using less restrictive ‘support’ 
options for cognitively impaired individuals.  Overall, it demonstrated the viability of 
supported decision-making, but highlighted the requirement for training and guidance for 
supporters; the need for monitoring and oversight of support agreements to ensure they 
work as intended; the lack of legal protection with informal support agreements; and the 
absence of clarity about the “boundaries and intersections” between supported decision-
making and guardianship.65       
 
It is unclear whether supported decision-making has been used to assist with decisions 
about entering sexual relationships.  While the Swedish personal ombudsman system has 
been used to assist with questions about sexuality, it is unclear whether sexuality is used 
to mean sexual identity and orientation, or sexual relationships, or both.  However, the 
evaluation of the South Australia pilot found that the majority of participants wanted to 
have support to make decisions about relationships (although not expressly sexual 
relationships).66  Although discussions about sexual relations might be regarded as 
intrusive or embarrassing, this assumption can be an obstacle to addressing questions of 
sexual health and wellbeing in the elderly.67  In the context of medical care, research 
shows that older individuals want to be asked about sexual function as a way of providing 
an opportunity to discuss concerns.68  On this basis, with the right supporter in place, a 
collaborative and companion based supported decision-making process may actually lend 
itself to decisions about personal matters, including sex.  In particular, a trusted supporter 
could be well placed to discuss the benefits, risks, and relationship(s) in question and the 
relevant options for reaching a decision.   
 
An amendment to the PPPRA that creates responsibilities and standing for supporters to 
participate in decision-making processes would provide legal recognition for the 
  
64 The pilot was run by the South Australian Office of the Public Advocate through a committee appointed 
under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1993, which allowed the Public Advocate to set up 
committees for advice on areas relevant to its functions. 
65 Mary-Ann De Mestre “Supported Decision Making as an Alternative to Guardianship Orders: The South 
Australian Trial” (2014) 8 Elder L. Rev. 1, at 3. 
66 Margaret Wallace Evaluation of the Supported Decision-Making Project (South Australian Office of the 
Public Advocate, Report, November 2012) at 30.   
67 Sharon Hinchcliff and Merryn Gott “Seeking Medical Help for Sexual Concerns in Mid and Later Life: 
A Review of the Literature” (2011) 48 Journal of Sex Research 106, at 112. 
68 Above n 67, at 114. 
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important role of social relationships to decision-making capacity.69  Moreover, a 
statutory framework could ensure that appropriate and enforceable safeguards were in 
place.  For example, there might be restrictions on who could be appointed;70 a 
requirement to consult with or have a supporter present for specific decisions; express 
reference to invalidating decisions made under duress; and a complaints process that is 
accessible to the supported adult and others interested in that person’s welfare.  The 
Canadian requirement for supported decisions to be tried or “carefully considered”71 
before guardianship orders are made would emphasise the value of supported decision-
making in a hierarchy of decision-making.  Such a direction might also provide clarity as 
to the relationship between supported decision-making and substituted decision-making, 
and underscore the fact that supported decisions are made and communicated with 
assistance, but are not the decision of the supporter.    
 
To balance the need for protection, where required, statutory provisions could permit a 
supporter to use information obtained in his or her role to make an application to the court, 
either for personal orders or guardianship.72  To avoid undermining the voluntarily agreed 
support relationship, the circumstances in which the court’s intervention may be sought 
could be limited to those where, objectively, the proposed decision places the individual 
concerned (or others) at risk of harm.  This may provide a supported individual with some 
assurance that it is only where they are reasonably perceived to be at risk that their 
supporter may seek the court’s involvement (and possibly a substituted decision).  In this 
way, supported decision-making could look to uphold autonomy while also questioning 
capacity and the need for protection.  
 
However, it must be recognised that supporters will have minds of their own: “[i]t seems 
doubtful that supported decisions can somehow be cleansed of the personality and values 
of the support person”.73  This could have a number of implications, including the 
possibility that the way in which options and risks around sexual relations are framed may 
(even unconsciously) be influenced by the supporter’s views.  This ‘undue’ influence may 
  
69 The Canadian model is worthy of close consideration should this option be pursued in New Zealand. 
70 See for example Decision Making, Support and Protection to Adults Act 2003 (Yukon, Canada), s 7(b) 
which expressly excludes a person against whom an order has been made under Family Violence Protection 
legislation, or who is the subject of an adult protection order under Decision Making, Support and Protection 
to Adults Act.  
71 Above n 61, s 2(d). 
72 See for example Decision Making, Support and Protection to Adults Act 2003 (Yukon, Canada), s 
10(3)(c). 
73 Above n 38, at 86. 
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override the expressed wishes of the individual.  Another issue is that those individuals 
who are isolated or in conflict with family may have difficulty finding an appropriate 
support person.  Unless advocates or other volunteers are prepared to assist, the model 
may favour those who already have the support they need for decision-making.  
Nevertheless, these challenges do not necessarily undermine the support principle.  With 
an appropriate statutory framework, education for individuals and supporters, and legal 
protections in place, voluntary supported decision-making might offer a person with 
progressively declining capacity an intermediate step before the possibility of more 
interventionist substituted decision-making.   
B Substituted Decision-Making 
Substituted decision-making refers to legally enforceable decisions that are made on 
behalf of an incompetent adult.  Substituted decisions may be made by a welfare guardian 
appointed under the PPPRA (with respect to a wholly incompetent adult), an EPA 
appointed by a competent adult (and who has the power to act only when the donor wholly 
lacks capacity as to personal care and welfare) or by the court exercising powers to make 
personal orders under the PPPRA.74  Substituted decisions may facilitate or override the 
expressed wishes of the incompetent adult.  Except as limited by s 18 PPPRA, a 
substituted decision made by a welfare guardian or EPA has the same effect as if it was 
made by the incompetent adult.75   
 
Unlike the UK,76  substituted decisions to consent to sexual relations are not expressly 
excluded by the PPPRA.  While substituted decisions relating to marriage and civil unions 
are expressly excluded by s 18(1)(a) PPPRA, these relationships and decisions are not 
directly analogous with sexual relations for the reasons explained above.77  In particular, 
sexual relations may occur outside of legally recognised relationships.  Additionally, it is 
arguable that sexual relations can reasonably be regarded as a part of a person’s living 
arrangements, about which there is the express power to make substituted decisions by 
way of personal order.78  It is observed that a welfare guardian or EPA with broad or 
  
74 The High Court expressly retains its inherent jurisdiction, including parens patriae, which may permit it 
to make orders with respect to incompetent individuals who are unable to make decisions for themselves.  
See PPPRA, s 114 and Judicature Act 1908, s 17. 
75 PPPRA, s 19 and s 98(5). 
76 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 27(1)(b). 
77 See p 6, and the comment that marriage is not solely concerned with sexual relations and, unlike most 
sexual relationships, it involves a potentially long-lasting legal relationship with implications for property 
and inheritance rights. 
78 PPPRA, s 10(1)(e). 
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undefined powers as to personal care and welfare could reasonably be guided as to the 
scope of their decision-making ability by the range of personal orders available under the 
PPPRA. 
 
The High Court has held that the phrase ‘living arrangements’ encompasses “…all aspects 
of the subject person’s environment including where they live, with whom they have 
contact, and who they are cared by.”79  Orders encompassing ‘all living arrangements’ 
are, therefore, potentially very wide.80 The High Court has upheld a personal order that 
permitted unsupervised contact between an incompetent woman and her mother, on the 
basis that the order facilitated and promoted her “rights to a full family life.”81 This is 
judicial recognition of the right to a family life (at least in the PPPRA jurisdiction), which 
at international law has been interpreted as including the freedom to enter into sexual 
relations.82  If it is accepted that sexual relations form a relevant aspect of living 
arrangements, then it is not inconceivable that, on the right facts, substituted decisions 
could extend to permitting physical contact, or at least not excluding such contact, with a 
sexual partner in a ‘home’ environment. 
 
Welfare guardians and EPAs considering such questions must have regard to an 
individual’s best interests:83 
 
The purpose of the best interests test is to consider matters from the [person’s] 
point of view.  That is not to say his wishes must prevail…But insofar as it is 
possible to ascertain the [person’s] wishes and feelings, his beliefs and values 
or the things which were important to him, it is those which should be taken 
into account because they are a component in making the choice which is right 
for him as an individual human being.  
 
Thus, subjective wishes must be ascertained to the extent that that is possible.  Welfare 
guardians and EPAs, who are commonly (but not exclusively) family members, may have 
  
79 T-E v B [Contact] [2009] NZFLR 844 (HC), at [22].   
80 Above n 79, at [19]. 
81 Above n 79, at [26].   
82 While this High Court decision predates Supreme Court authority rejecting the existence of a right to a 
private life and family life in New Zealand (above n 52), it provides some evidence of a common law right 
to a family life in New Zealand which may become relevant if or when a right to sex is directly examined 
by New Zealand courts. 
83 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, at [45], [2014] 1 All ER 
573. 
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some knowledge of an individual’s relationships and pre-incapacity values, behaviour or 
attitude to sex which can guide an understanding of expressed wishes as to sexual 
relations.  In addition, it is likely that welfare guardians and EPAs would be provided with 
information from others, including resthome staff and supporters (e.g., if adopted, legally 
recognised supported decision-makers), as to the risks or benefits of the proposed sexual 
contact, the relationship with the sexual partner, and the matters discussed with the 
individual concerned.  It is suggested that these contextual factors are not only relevant to 
questions of capacity, but also to determining the appropriateness of facilitating expressed 
wishes.  It is also suggested that the consultative and encouragement requirements for 
welfare guardians and EPAs indicate that the law accepts that even wholly incompetent 
adults should retain some influence over decisions relating to their care and welfare.   
 
There is no obligation to uphold incompetently expressed wishes.  Welfare guardians and 
EPAs also have a responsibility to consider an incompetent person’s welfare, which may 
require taking steps to protect individuals from decisions that place them at risk of harm.  
While the court’s objective is to make the “least restrictive intervention possible,”84 it too 
must be mindful of protecting those whose limited capacity means they are not capable of 
appreciating risk.85  However, it is trite to observe that the overly protective exercise of 
power, without good cause, may undermine what could be said to be genuine choices in 
the circumstances.  In the face of an expressed wish for sexual relations, which in its 
particular context presents no objective or reported risk to the individual, there is 
theoretically no reason why a substituted decision could not be accepted as valid consent.   
 
Whether this ‘third party consent’ to sexual relations would satisfy the criminal law, and 
in particular the provisions intended to protect impaired persons from sexual activity 
which they are deemed incapable to consent or refuse consent to, remains to be seen.86  
However, it is relevant that a substituted decision has the same legal effect as it would 
have if it had been made by the person concerned,87 and that a court order can provide 
legally effective ‘consent’  in circumstances that would otherwise be an assault (e.g. 
medical treatment).  As such, it is arguable that a substituted decision to facilitate the 
desire of the subject person does not permit non-consensual sex but, instead, confirms 
consent on behalf of an otherwise incompetent adult.      
 
  
84 PPPRA, s 8(a). 
85 Above n 31. 
86 Crimes Act 1961, s 128A(5). 
87 PPPRA, s 19 and s 98(5). 
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Substituted decisions about sexual relations may, however, be problematic for other 
reasons.  For the decision-maker, any uncertainty whatsoever as to the appropriateness of 
facilitating sexual relations will inevitably (and perhaps properly) err on the side of 
protection.  The implications of a decision to refuse sexual contact could lead to practical 
enforcement difficulties, whether managing the expectations of the person whose wishes 
have been overruled or physically policing and preventing sexual contact.  This could 
result in intrusive management strategies for resthomes rightly concerned about the risk 
of criminal liability.88  For the person concerned, substituted decision-making carries the 
risk that they become subject to the moral judgements of others.  What the decision-maker 
considers acceptable could be informed by unfair or incorrect perceptions that the elderly 
are “asexual and disinterested in sex or hypersexual to the point of perversion”.89  This 
risk may be particularly stark where a person’s pre-incapacity relationships and values are 
unknown or not fully taken into account.   
 
The latter emphasises the value of conversations about sexual relations taking place prior 
to incapacity.   It is the apparent lack of focus on such conversations that is central to the 
argument that more can and should be done to address the question of incapacity and 
sexual relations in the elderly.   
 
VI What More Can or Should be Done?  
 
As people age they tend to make decisions that are focused on the end of their life, such 
as making a will or even making prospective decisions about medical treatment relevant 
to the end of life.  However, it is much less clear whether many (if any) people consider 
how they might want to live in the event of incapacity, or the importance to them of 
intimate or sexual relationships in those circumstances.  For some, this may be because 
the topic is taboo.  For others, the implications of incapacity and sex are unknown or not 
regarded as sufficiently important to discuss or plan for.  For most, it is suggested, this is 
a topic that is simply not raised with them, even when they enter resthome care, possibly 
for fear of causing offence or embarrassment.      
 
The risks of failing to address such questions in the resthome context is illustrated by the 
case of a 78 year old US man charged with, and later acquitted of, sexually abusing his 
  
88 Crimes Act 1961, s 195A.  
89 Above n 33, at 458.  
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wife who suffered from alzheimers and lived in a resthome.90  The husband’s prosecution 
served as a “wakeup call” for resthomes to be explicit with patients and families about 
sex.91  This message is equally applicable to New Zealand resthomes, and it is 
recommended below that industry agreed guidelines about sexual relationships should be 
developed.  The “wakeup call” also highlights the need for older adults planning for their 
later years to consider ways in which others can be made aware of all aspects of their life 
that are important to them, including relationships with others.  In this respect, an advance 
directive is one tool worthy of further consideration.      
A Advance Directives 
An advance directive is a mechanism to express competent wishes prior to incapacity.  
The Code of Rights affirms the ability to make an advance directive, whether in writing 
or orally, about possible future health care procedures.92  Significantly, a valid advance 
directive can provide lawful justification not to provide life-saving treatment where such 
treatment has been anticipated and expressly refused by the (now) incompetent person. 
This is consistent with every competent adult’s right to refuse medical treatment.93  While 
advance directives are commonly seen and used in medical treatment, there is no logical 
basis why a form of advance directive could not be used to express competent wishes 
about any decision that may arise in the event of incapacity.  In this regard, it is relevant 
that advance directives are considered a “natural extension” to the principles of autonomy 
and respect for autonomy.94   
 
A number of factors are applicable to the validity of an advance directive, including the 
circumstances in which it is made and when it is made; that is, an advance directive will 
become ‘stale’ with age and changing circumstances.  Advance directives also have 
limitations.  Clearly, an oral advance directive will lack force unless it is given widely and 
frequently.   Even if the advance directive is in writing, there is no central repository for 
  
90 “Former Iowa legislator Henry Royhons, 78, found not guilty of sexually abusing wife with alzheimers” 
(23 April 2015) The Washington Post < www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/04/23/former-iowa-legislator-henry-rayhons-78-found-not-guilty-of-sexually-abusing-wife-
with-alzheimers> accessed 24 February 2016. 
91 “Rayhons: ‘truth finally came out’ with not guilty verdict’” (22 April 2015) The Des Moines Register 
<www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-and-courts/2015/04/22/henry-rayhons-acquitted-sexual-
abuse> accessed 24 February 2016. 
92 Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights, clause 4.  
93 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 11. 
94 Iris Reuvecamp “Advancing Individual Autonomy in Healthcare Decision Making – the Role of Advance 
Directives” [2015] NZLJ 79. 
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such directives, and therefore unless its existence (and location) is made known prior to 
incapacity it may never be taken into account.  These are factors that require careful 
inquiry, particularly when someone enters resthome care. 
 
Another key limitation is that while an advance directive purports to give legal force to 
anticipatory decisions, stated preferences are unlikely to override obligations to protect a 
vulnerable adult.  In particular, if the context demonstrates vulnerability and the need for 
protection that will very likely take priority over a previously expressed preference for 
sexual contact.  In light of this, it seems unlikely that an advance directive could give valid 
consent to sexual relations at some future point in time.  That said, there is still value in a 
competent adult providing written guidance on future decisions affecting the way they 
would like to live if incapacitated.  It is relevant that an EPA (and probably others) may 
have regard to an advance directive when making substituted decisions.95  Importantly, it 
is arguable that competently expressed wishes as to sexual relations, or competent 
assertions relevant to sexual values and wellbeing, may be more influential than a later, 
incompetent, expression of wishes.  For example, a (written) statement could helpfully 
record the existence of a longstanding, close and loving relationship, and the desire to 
continue with intimate contact following incapacity.  It could include reference to 
mutually acceptable sexual contact, or requests for overnight stays and/or a double bed.  
Equally, it could simply record that physical relationships and/or intimacy are important 
to that person’s wellbeing or identity.   In this way, an advance directive could be a 
valuable source of information for others about pre-incapacity preferences.   
 
One possible issue that might impact on the use of advance directives for the purposes 
described here is that the term may be associated with prospective decisions about dying.  
This is inconsistent with the intended focus, which is to encourage prospective 
consideration of decisions about living.  It is suggested that older adults may be more 
inclined to record their wishes as “living choices” or a “values history”,96 and it is 
recommended that this positive language is adopted to promote the importance of 
documenting personal choices.   
 
  
95 PPPRA, s 99A(2). 
96 The term “values history” is taken from Inés Maria Barrio-Cantalejo, Adoración Molina-Ruiz, Pablo 
Simón-Lorda, Carmen Cámara-Medina, Isabel Toral López, Maria del Mar Rodríguez del Águila and Rosa 
Maria Bailón-Gómez “Advance Directives and Proxies’ Predictions About Patients’ Treatment Preferences” 
(2009) 16 Nursing Ethics 93. 
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B Guidance for Resthomes  
Resthomes will undoubtedly encounter individuals with differing levels of capacity and 
risk factors.  Some individuals entering resthome care may have a reduced physical ability 
to care for themselves, but are competent to make decisions about all aspects of their life.  
Others may have fluctuating capacity, in that they are able to make decisions about day-
to-day personal choices but might not have capacity to make significant decisions, for 
example to sell property.  Some residents will be admitted to resthome care with a welfare 
guardian or EPA in place to make substituted decisions on their behalf, in consultation 
with them, whereas others may be admitted to a resthome due to a total loss of capacity 
with no formal decision-making mechanism in place.  Whether capacity is present, 
questionable, or absent, resthomes have a responsibility to manage the wellbeing of their 
residents. 
 
There are currently no national or industry-wide agreed standards for managing questions 
about sexual relations in resthomes.  In the absence of such standards, the onus rests on 
individual resthomes to ensure residents receive services that meet individual needs.  
While research suggests that sex and intimacy can remain important even for incapacitated 
elderly, “few care facilities have implemented policies or [staff] training” directed at 
sexual expression.97  In the absence of policies, management strategies and staff training, 
it is arguable that resthomes might not be meeting residents’ individual needs.   
 
The first opportunity to ensure that decisions accord with residents’ needs is on admission.   
It is suggested that resthomes need to be skilled and proactive to include discussion about 
sexual relationships as part of the admission process, perhaps as part of recording a 
person’s “living choices” or advance directive.  This will be particularly important where 
the resident has capacity or partial capacity on admission, as this could represent the best 
chance to understand their needs before any significant incapacity occurs.  The admission 
process might, for example, include questions about whether the resident has any close 
relationships, whether he or she is sexually active, and whether they wish to continue with 
sexual activity.  The resident should have a choice about whether or not to answer, 
although it would be helpful to explain that their expressed wishes could become relevant 
in the event of incapacity.   
   
  
97 Laci Cornelison and Gayle Doll “Management of Sexual Expression in Long-Term Care” (2013) 53 
Gerontologist 780. 
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Admission is, however, just a starting point.  An ongoing process of evaluating the 
appropriateness of sexual relations is relevant to discharging resthomes’ obligations to 
protect individuals from harm.  Given the potential legal significance for resthomes and 
individuals, industry-wide agreed guidelines addressing sexual relations are 
recommended.  Any such guidelines should be drafted in consultation with other relevant 
agencies, including the HDC and organisations with an interest in ageing and the rights of 
older people.  The HDC could provide input into the applicability of the Code of Rights, 
and the views of the elderly could be an effective counterbalance to what might be an 
overly protective starting point by resthomes.   
 
While it is accepted that resthomes need to balance individual freedom alongside their 
protective responsibilities, it is suggested that the guidelines should start with a 
presumption of competence.  Staff (and family) should be reminded not to make 
assumptions about incapacity on the basis of the level of support that a person needs in 
other aspects of day-to-day life, and to take a non-judgemental approach to proposed 
sexual activity.  Likewise, guidelines should ensure that staff are alive to the possibility 
that family or carers may try to influence residents not to have sexual relations, even if 
there is no basis for the objection.  Guidelines should encourage ongoing discussion with 
residents about sexual relationships, including, where relevant, asking those residents who 
are known to be sexually active how they feel about their relationship.  Similarly, 
guidelines should advise staff to watch for changes in behaviour after intimate contact, 
and to record and discuss with senior staff any incidents of concern or unusual behaviour 
relevant to sexual activity.   
 
It is anticipated that guidelines would be most useful, and perhaps most instructive, where 
competence is questionable and the appropriate management response to the sexual 
contact is uncertain.  In those circumstances, guidelines should require consideration of 
factors that could affect capacity (e.g. a diagnosis of dementia, and the stage of the 
disease); discussion about the resident’s understanding of the functional aspects and 
consequences of sexual activity and their views of the relationship in question; any non-
verbal cues indicating consent, and any previously expressed wishes; what, if any, support 
structures or persons are used by the resident, and seeking that support where appropriate; 
the circumstances in which any capacity assessment takes place (including any factors 
that could temporarily affect capacity); and any other relevant persons to consult about 
the genuineness of the person’s choice.  The guidelines could suggest specific questions 
to assist with determining a person’s level of understanding.  For example, one New York 
LAWS 543 Anita Miller  199102449 
 
25 
 
resthome asks its staff to “pose questions like…‘what would you do if you wanted it to 
stop?”.98  Appropriately framed questions could provide practical assistance for staff. 
 
Any guidelines should also expressly address possible signs of vulnerability, exploitation 
or sexual assault in recognition that incapacity may make elderly people at risk of sexual 
abuse.  In addition to assessing any changes in mood (before or after sexual contact), 
guidelines might require staff to be vigilant for any signs of inappropriate pressure for sex; 
any indications of disinhibited sexual behaviour; and to take seriously any reports of 
sexually inappropriate behaviour.  Staff should also be mindful that duress can vitiate 
consent, and guidelines could suggest circumstances in which it will be appropriate for 
discussions to take place without the sexual partner present.  Finally, guidelines could 
provide direction on when intervention might be necessary and practical management 
tools to prevent sexual contact in the event of incapacity.   
   
VII Conclusion 
 
While incapacity may make an older person susceptible to sexual abuse or exploitation, 
diminished capacity does not always equate to vulnerability that should automatically 
exclude individuals from sexual relations.  In some cases, older adults with impaired 
capacity may retain the ability to make genuine choices about sexual relations, and those 
relationships may be important to maintaining their overall health and wellbeing.  It is 
argued that context, including relationships with others, can influence capacity.  
Therefore, to respect autonomy, those raising questions about capacity for sexual relations 
should be required to consider the whole context in which the (proposed) sexual relations 
arise, and the context in which capacity assessments take place.   
 
Where capacity is in question, supported decision-making and substituted decision-
making are advocated as effective options to support or facilitate legally valid decisions 
about sexual relations.  Importantly, both options can allow for concerned others to 
question the genuineness of choice, to assess risk and vulnerability in the circumstances, 
and to seek protection where objectively necessary.  Advance directives, or “living 
choices” are encouraged as a tool for individuals to ensure that their pre-incapacity values, 
relationships and preferences are known to others.   
 
  
98 “Sex, Dementia and a Husband on Trial at Age 78” (13 April 2015) The New York Times 
<www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/health/sex-dementia-and-a-husband-henry-rayhons-on-trial-at-age-78> 
accessed 22 February 2016. 
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Finally, while resthomes seem to recognise the complexities that can arise with sexual 
relations in the resthome setting, there has been no industry agreed response as to how this 
should be managed.  However, resthomes legal and professional obligations should be 
sufficient motivation for them to adopt a proactive approach to discussing this topic with 
residents (and intended residents), and for the development and implementation of 
guidelines on managing sexual relations.  Guidelines would be a helpful, open and 
transparent response to the issues that can arise, and is one way to ensure that an effective 
balance is struck between individual autonomy and carers’ responsibilities. 
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